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Abstract
The reform of the welfare state entails changes in interdependent policy fields
stretching from social policies to employment and wage policies. These linked
policy fields are often governed by varying sets of corporate actors and involve
different decision making procedures. Adaptation in one policy field is often un-
coordinated with other policies, and can work at cross-purposes, produce nega-
tive externalities, or fail due to missing supporting conditions. The paper has two
objectives. It first argues that renewed emergence of tripartite concertation is due
to the need to co-ordinate policies across policy fields. Second, it evaluates the
institutional factors which have facilitated concertation in some cases, but not in
others. Using a similar country design, the paper compares four continental
European countries with similar reform pressures but different reform trajecto-
ries: France, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands.
Zusammenfassung
Die Reform des Wohlfahrtsstaates erfordert Veränderungen in interdependenten
Politikfeldern, von der Sozialpolitik bis hin zur Beschäftigungs- und Lohnpolitik.
Diese interdependenten Politikfelder werden von unterschiedlichen Konstellati-
onen korporativer und politischer Akteure kontrolliert und sind unterschiedli-
chen Verfahren der Entscheidungsfindung unterworfen. Adaptionen in einem
Sektor sind häufig nicht mit anderen politischen Entscheidungen koordiniert
und können somit negative Auswirkungen haben oder aufgrund der ungünsti-
gen Grundbedingungen fehlschlagen.
In dem vorliegenden Discussion Paper wird zunächst argumentiert, daß die
Notwendigkeit, politische Entscheidungen über die Grenzen der politischen Sek-
toren hinaus zu koordinieren, zu einer Renaissance dreiseitiger Konzertierung
zwischen Tarifparteien und Regierungen geführt hat. Weiterhin werden die in-
stitutionellen Faktoren herausgearbeitet, die eine Konzertierung in einigen Fällen
ermöglicht haben, in anderen jedoch nicht. Es werden vier Länder verglichen, die
ähnliche Strukturen und Reformzwänge aufweisen, aber unterschiedliche Lö-
sungswege gewählt haben: Frankreich, Deutschland, Italien und die Niederlande.
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1 Introduction
The reform of the welfare state is on the political agenda in Europe. Given the
challenge of high unemployment, economic internationalisation and socio-demo-
graphic changes, more and more governments seek to adapt social and employ-
ment policies. The reform pressures are relatively similar in continental European
welfare states, since they all suffer from the same ills of the “welfare without
work” syndrome (Esping-Andersen 1996). Yet while some governments have
unilaterally pushed for reforms against vested interests, others have sought con-
certation in order to co-ordinate adaptation and achieve a broad social consensus
for change. Our goal is to provide an explanation for the apparent divergences of
national reform approaches in four continental European welfare states which
otherwise share similar reform pressures: the Netherlands, Italy, France and
Germany. The Netherlands have been noted as a success story of concertation
(Visser and Hemerijck 1997), and Italy’s recent experience of government-union
agreements on reforming wage bargaining and pension policies can be seen as an
example of concerted reform (Regini 1997). On the other hand, Germany serves as
a case where concertation has not been successful thus far despite the initiatives
of two different governments (Bispinck 1997). Moreover, the French example
shows that large social conflicts over unilateral welfare reform can occur (Uter-
wedde 1998).
Comparing these four continental European welfare states, we seek an answer to
the question: why do some countries choose to engage in concertation to adopt
reform measures, while others show patterns of deadlock or contestation? We
think there are two reasons why concertation plays an important role in the re-
form of the welfare state. First, welfare state reform entails more than welfare re-
trenchment (that is, merely cutting public expenditure), it involves the adaptation
of social, employment and wage policies which are largely interdependent, in
particular in respect to their impact on employment. Second, concerted reform
built on a consensus of governments, employers and unions can be crucial not
only to overcome potential blockages against reforms but also to co-ordinate poli-
cies across policy fields. These two rationales for studying concerted reform re-
flect two strands of current research which we seek to bridge.
Thus far, the current academic debate on welfare state retrenchment has been
largely focused on a quantitative approach that looks mainly at expenditure cuts
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(Clayton and Pontusson 1998). Even where governments were most determined
to curtail social expenditure as in the UK and the USA, overall welfare retrench-
ment has remained limited and welfare cuts at best patch-work. While overall
welfare spending did not decrease much, certain social groups – especially wel-
fare recipients who have no veto powers – were hard hit by reductions in bene-
fits. The inability of governments to substantially roll back welfare and, par-
ticularly, to alter core parts of social security has been explained by the lack of
popularity, the diffuse long-term benefits of such measures, and by institutional
lock-in effects (Pierson 1994). Nevertheless, the welfare state is undergoing a
more profound restructuring process, for example, by shifting from public to pri-
vate welfare provision (Shalev 1996). In contrast to the period of welfare expan-
sion, today’s politics of welfare restructuring seem to reflect the cross-class alli-
ances in which export sector interests of employers and labour are juxtaposed
with, or even prevail against, the interests of the public (or sheltered) sector (Pier-
son 1998; Clayton and Pontusson 1998). These insights seem to suggest that we
ought to understand welfare state reform in a broader context of labour market
changes and the role of the social partners.
A second strand of studies has looked at the renaissance of concertation through
social pacts during the 1990s (Fajertag and Pochet 1997; Hassel 1998; Schmitter
and Grote 1997). They see tripartite concertation as a response to enhanced inter-
national competition and public budget constraints. In the run up to European
Monetary Union many governments have opted for co-operation with domestic
political actors to achieve the convergence criteria, thereby engaging in “com-
petitive corporatism” (Rhodes 1997). We think, however, that the underlying
logic of social pacts is misunderstood by focussing too narrowly on the issue of
wage restraint for competitiveness. Social policy reform – cutting social contribu-
tions and payroll taxes to boost employment, and adapting social insurance to
new employment forms – is as important a part of social pacts as wage restraint
and deserves to be studied as well.
Hence we want to advance two arguments which bridge both research perspec-
tives. First, concerted reform addresses the institutional regulation of welfare re-
gimes – consisting of wage bargaining, labour market policies, social transfers
and labour law. Second, concertation is dependent on institutional prerequisites,
most importantly the governance of policy fields. In continental Europe, unions
and employers can play a facilitating or an impeding role since they are often in-
volved in the self-administration of social security and occupy many veto positi-
ons within the political system. Since governments have largely lost the means to
buy consent from social partners through welfare expansion, they have to be
more strategic and capable of convincingly threatening the social partners with
intervention in order to compel them into co-operation. On the other hand, when
Ebbinghaus, Hassel: Striking Deals 7
the trade unions can influence the outcome of reforms and avoid unilateral impo-
sition, they have a rational interest in concertation, particularly when state inter-
vention is likely.
Following a most-similar country design, we have chosen four continental Euro-
pean countries as examples of conservative welfare state regimes that tend to rely
on payroll taxes, provide mainly earnings-related benefits, and are primarily
transfer-oriented. Since the mid-1970s these welfare states have suffered from
“welfare without work” (Esping-Andersen 1996), that is, high levels of unem-
ployment and relative low employment rates (Table 1). They face the dilemma of
an increasingly inactive population which receives social transfers paid by a
shrinking active population (Scharpf 1998). Because welfare standards are high
Table 1 Labour Market and Welfare State Indicators, 1980–1996a
Employment
rate
(%)
Social
expenditures
(% GDP)
Social
wage costs
(%)
Unemployment
rate
(%)
Country 1980 1996 1980 1995 1980 1995 1980–89 1990–96
Universalist
Sweden 79.4 69.8 29.8 33.4 39.0 41.4 2.7 7.0
Denmark 75.4 74.2 27.5 32.6 . . . . 8.0 b 8.3 b
Continental
Germany c 66.3 64.0 25.7 29.6 42.9 44.9 5.9 6.7
France 63.8 58.8 23.5 30.1 44.4 48.1 9.0 10.9
Netherlands 54.2 66.4 28.5 28.0 43.2 44.5 9.7 6.6
Italy 56.2 51.3 18.4 23.7 46.0 50.2 9.5 10.8
Liberal/residual
UK 70.2 68.7 18.3 22.8 28.1 28.6 10.0 9.0
USA 66.9 73.6 13.7 16.3 26.4 28.1 7.2 6.3
Japan 70.3 74.1d 9.9 14.1 38.8 41.6 2.5 2.6
a Standardized unemployment rates (OECD definition), except for Denmark.
b Denmark: non-standardized unemployment rate.
c West Germany only.
d 1995.
Sources: OECD Labour Force Statistics (for employment rates), OECD Employment Outlooks (for unemploy-
ment rates), OECD Social Expenditure Statistics (for social expenditures) and Institut der Deutschen Wirtschaft
(for social wage costs). Calculations by authors.
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and the labour market dynamic is low, indirect labour costs and financial pres-
sure on social security systems are high, amplified by increased international
competition and EMU’s convergence requirements. In all four countries, govern-
ments have responded with a whole range of welfare reforms during the last two
decades. Even though the German and French governments have invited the so-
cial partners to tripartite talks several times in the 1990s, they have not – thus far
at least – been able to achieve the sequence of concerted reforms as achieved by
their Dutch and Italian neighbours.
In the next section, we will discuss the governance structure of policy fields as a
useful analytical concept for studying concertation in welfare reforms. We will
argue that the degree of autonomy from state intervention in the two policy fields
is crucial for explaining the willingness of social partners to enter into concerta-
tion and make commitments. The second and third sections will provide an over-
view of the policy process in the fields of wage bargaining and pension policy.
The final section develops an explanation of the success (or failure) of the con-
certation process. We are aware of the limitations of a four-country study: Such a
“small-n” comparison cannot rule out alternative explanations. Future research
could test our hypothesis against the experience of other continental European
welfare states, such as the intervention of the Belgian state into wage bargaining,
the Austrian concerted pension reforms, or the Portuguese concertation efforts.
2 Preconditions for Concerted Reforms: Modes of Governance and
Bargaining Power
In order to understand why some continental European welfare states relied on
concertation in reforming wage formation and social policies, it is useful to study
the way in which these policy fields are linked, how they are governed, and the
role the three main actors play. Our approach to concertation uses insights from
corporatist studies on organised interests, in particular on “private interest gov-
ernment” (Streeck and Schmitter 1985) and the more recent governance approach
(Hollingsworth, Schmitter, and Streeck 1994). In contrast to unilateral reforms
common to Anglo-Saxon welfare retrenchment and deregulation in industrial re-
lations, concerted reform is the result of voluntary concertation. This can be tri-
partite negotiations between the state, employers and trade unions or self-regula-
tion which is delegated by the state to (or traditionally assumed by) the collective
interest organisations.
As was the case with the corporatist income policies of the 1970s, a necessary pre-
requisite of today’s concertation is that the participating collective organisations
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can assure the support and compliance of their members and that they are enti-
tled, capable and recognised as corporate actors to negotiate contracts with other
associations (Hollingsworth, Schmitter, and Streeck 1994: 7). In this respect, asso-
ciations perform a double mediation process: As collective organisations they
mediate between their members, and they intermediate with other corporate ac-
tors in the policy field (Streeck and Schmitter 1985). In contrast to public policy
making, policy making by trade unions and employer associations is not based
on publicly legitimated force, but rather on their associational power: their mem-
bership strength, organisational resources, and mutual recognition.
Under governance we understand the regulation of the “rules of the game” that
define the competencies of collective actors and the mode by which they interact
in the decision making process. The governance structure also shapes the oppor-
tunity structure of corporate actors and the policy style of decision-making proc-
esses (Visser and Hemerijck 1997: 54). Two aspects are crucial for the governance
of these policy fields: first, the capacity of the state to intervene into self-regula-
tion and, second, the social partners capacity to veto political decisions and their
role in implementation.
In its role as regulator, the state establishes the institutional conditions under
which collective action and employment relations take place. The right to organ-
ise collectively, negotiate binding agreements, and use strike or lockout are regu-
lated by labour law, as are the general conditions of employment contracts. By
legislation and/or by court decisions it may regulate who takes part in negotia-
tions and which associations are entitled to sign binding agreements, which can
become a political decision in systems with politically split union movements. In
addition to procedural regulation, the state may have the right to intervene di-
rectly into the material regulation of wages, that is, set minimum wages and/or
set limits to wage increases (wage freeze). The state’s capacity to intervene into
“free” collective bargaining is thus manifold: by deciding on the rules of the
game, by supporting one actor, by changing perceptions through information,
and by intervening directly when decisions cannot be reached otherwise. Simi-
larly, the state plays a crucial role for social security systems, imposing manda-
tory insurance, financing or subsidising social expenditures from taxation, setting
benefit and contribution levels, regulating non-state insurance and providing tax
incentives.
Both industrial relations and social security are “shared” public spaces between
state and organised interests (Crouch 1986), though the degree of autonomy of
the actors varies between the fields and across countries. Where the social part-
ners have self-regulatory competencies, governments need their consent for re-
form, be it that they have veto possibilities or they are needed for the implemen-
tation. When the social partners are relatively autonomous and the state is not
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part of the negotiations, much depends on the goodwill of the social partners to
serve the common interest. In these circumstances the potential of state interven-
tion in the absence of agreement – the “shadow of the state” – can be crucial in
putting pressure on the social partners to negotiate.
We assume that concerted reform processes result from “political exchange” (Piz-
zorno 1978) in which the government asks for social acceptance of reform polices
by the social partners, particularly the unions, who have a credible threat poten-
tial to obstruct welfare retrenchment policies in the industrial (strike) and politi-
cal (electoral) arena. In return, governments offer influence on decision making
and further political support to trade unions and employers’ confederations. In-
stead of mobilising their members against unilateral welfare retrenchment, un-
ions give their consent to a concerted reform, if they can safeguard some social
rights, cushion the effect of cuts, and receive more influence on changes. This po-
litical exchange involves two policy fields in particular: wage bargaining and
pension policies. In the following, we will look at both policy fields in order to
establish an empirically driven account of why concertation developed in some
cases and not in others.
3 Reforming Wage Bargaining
During the 1990s, international competitive pressure and the advance of Euro-
pean monetary union shifted governments' preferences in wage moderation from
fighting inflation to enhancing competitiveness, presuming that wage restraint in
favour of higher profits would lead to increased investments, economic growth
and job creation (Boyer 1994). The problem of containing wage developments has
been a long standing problem for most European countries – with the notable ex-
ception of Germany – for which governments have developed a whole set of cor-
poratist income policies during the post-war period (Flanagan, Soskice, and Ul-
man 1983; Dore, Boyer, and Mars 1994). During the days of trade union strength
centralised wage bargaining was frequently a means to achieve wage moderation.
However, from the early 1980s onwards employers in most countries started to
push for decentralisation and wage flexibilisation in order to adapt to heightened
competition and technological changes (Baglioni and Crouch 1990). The wage
bargaining systems in the four countries adapted very differently to those pres-
sures.
France has evolved from a long legacy of state-imposed incomes policy towards a
decentralisation of wage formation (Boyer 1994). In general, trade unions and em-
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ployers’ confederations played only a secondary role in wage formation. French
trade unions are not only politically divided, but also very weak in terms of
membership and have underdeveloped organisational structures (Ebbinghaus
and Visser 1999). French employers associations have long been divided between
the interests of nationalised industries and the paternalist small and medium-
sized firm sector. Employers and unions have a very antagonistic relationship at
national and workplace level, thereby provoking recurrent state intervention into
“free” collective bargaining. The state determines the floor of wage bargaining by
setting the nationwide minimum wage (SMIC), thereby leaving little bargaining
space. Moreover, the Minister of Labour has the right to extend “erga omnes”
collective agreements to an entire sector. Therefore an agreement that is not
agreed upon by all unions – for instance, not by the Communist CGT – could still
be made binding by the state.
Until the mid-1970s, generous minimum wage policy as well as competition by
unions led to wage pushes in the private sector that went beyond productivity
increases. After the first oil shock, the government attempted to keep wage in-
creases down through wage freezes in 1976/77, temporary price and wage con-
trols, severe wage guidelines and slower minimum wage increases. The new
Socialist government pursued a new income policy, departing from wage indexa-
tion. It also attempted to reform collective bargaining by passing the 1982 Auroux
laws, which require annual plant-level negotiations between the employer and
workplace representatives. Yet, instead of providing the divided unions with
more bargaining power, under the new legislation companies found it easier to
introduce new more flexible pay systems (Howell 1992). Decentralisation has not
strengthened trade unions’ and employers’ capacity to regulate employment
conditions at branch or national level, but rather weakened them further and
strengthened local sectionalism (Goetschy 1998). In fact, decentralised bargaining
led to market-driven, employer-imposed wage settlements at the workplace level
against the will of unions, and unit labour costs have increased only slowly since
the 1980s. Therefore,
state power has rarely been sufficient to compensate for an inherent lack of trust
between business associations and unions, firms and wage earners. The pursuit of
incomes policies by a strong state has still achieved less than the broad vision of
social market economy and the complex set of fortuitously balanced institutions
typical of Germany. (Boyer 1994: 67)
German wage bargaining is the opposite case from French interventionism and
firm-level bargaining: the absence of state intervention in wage bargaining (Tarif-
autonomie) is legally enshrined. There has never been any centralized incomes
policy involving statutory wage guidelines. Even during the “concerted action”
in the 1970s, unions and employers held the view that wage bargaining was not
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to be discussed with the government. Wage development was nevertheless re-
sponsive to economic conditions due to the institutions of centralised industrial
unions, plant-level consultation procedures, and the tight monetary policy of the
Bundesbank, the autonomous central bank (Streeck 1997). While German indus-
trial unions have developed a system of pattern bargaining in which wage in-
creases are fairly standardised, these encompassing unions have to anticipate the
economic implications of wage increases and the possible monetary retaliation by
the Bundesbank (Scharpf 1991). German unions used the informal practice of “ex-
tra pay” above negotiated wage rates by larger companies as a way to achieve the
political aim of a solidaristic wage policy (the same pay for the same work) but
also to unofficially top-up wages where companies could afford it.
Chronology A: Concertation on Wage and Employment Reforms
Netherlands
1982 Bipartite Wassenaar Agreement on “General guidelines on employment policy”
1990 Bipartite agreement on “More employment for ethnic minorities”
1993 Bipartite agreement on “A new course: agenda for collective bargaining 1994”
1997 Bipartite agreement on “Agenda 2002”
Italy
1992 Tripartite agreement abolishing scala mobile
1993 (July) Ciampi Protocol: agreement on labour costs and collective
bargaining reform
1996 Employment Pact (accordo per il lavoro)
1998 Social Pact for Growth and Employment
Germany
1996 (Jan.-Feb.) talks on Alliance for Jobs and “Standort” Deutschland, (April) unions with-
draw; (Oct.) strikes on cutting statutory sick pay, later renegotiated in collective
agreements
1998 Alliance talks begin under new government (Dec.)
France
1982 Auroux law: annual firm-level bargaining
1997 Matignon Meeting; employers leave in protest over proposed workingt-time law
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This traditional wage formation process ran into problems in the 1990s when the
wage drift between negotiated and real wages narrowed and the wage squeeze
worsened as larger companies cut down on the extra pay during the recession
1991/92 (Hassel and Schulten 1998). Moreover, reunification put a great strain on
wage equality, since unions had pushed for fast wage equality at the expense of
east German companies that were still lagging behind in productivity. An at-
tempt to bring about a social pact was made by the metal workers’ union (IG
Metall) in November 1995. The union agreed to accept moderate wage increases
in exchange for an employer commitment to create a certain number of new jobs
and for government concessions on welfare cuts (Bispinck 1997). Warned by the
French social unrest at the time, the Centre-Right government invited the social
partners to summit talks. However, when the government presented its proposal
on welfare retrenchment in April 1996, the unions left the summit talks in protest.
Although neither a national pact nor a sectoral agreement in the metal industry
came about, the sectoral bargaining rounds of 1996 ended with moderate wage
increases. When the Social Democrats and the Greens took over the government
in 1998, they initiated a new tripartite concertation process; the issue of Tarifauto-
nomie was again hotly debated, but not resolved.
The Netherlands had a long post-war history of statutory wage policy – annual
guidelines by the Minister that were then subject to bipartite negotiations – which
was practised until 1963 and formally existed even until 1970. Thereafter, the
government retained the right to impose a wage freeze or a ceiling on wage de-
velopments, and intervened on seven occasions between 1970 and 1982. Collec-
tive bargaining was dominated by wage agreements in large enterprises, setting
the pattern for the rest of the industry and economy. In order to pre-empt state
intervention, the social partners committed themselves in the historic Wassenaar
Accord of 1982 to wage moderation below inflation and productivity growth
which aimed at reducing overall labour costs. Surprisingly, the voluntary self-
commitment let real wages decrease by 1.5% annually between 1980 and 1983
(Visser and Hemerijck 1997: 99). “Dutch unions, impressed by soaring unemploy-
ment, convinced themselves that improving the profitability of Dutch industry
was a sine qua non for whatever strategy of recovery and job growth” (Visser and
Hemerjick 1997: 81). Two days before the agreement of Wassenaar, the new gov-
ernment had announced that it was determined to freeze public wages, the mini-
mum wage and transfer payments and to abolish wage indexation. The unions
suffered from membership losses, organising less than 30% of Dutch workers in
the early 1980s (Ebbinghaus and Visser 1999), and had to swallow a voluntary ac-
ceptance of a de facto wage freeze in exchange for an offer by employers to negoti-
ate on working time. In 1984, the indexation of public sector pay and social trans-
fer payments were finally abandoned, and wage formation has remained below
price and productivity increases. In 1993, a new bipartite agreement (New Course)
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again pledged the continuation of a “responsible wage development” and co-
ordinated further decentralisation (Visser and Hemerijck 1997: 112).
Italian labour relations, like those in France, traditionally suffered from strife
between unions and employers. Co-operation between the social partners has
been difficult because of the relative fragility of collective bargaining and its low
level of institutionalisation, as well as political tensions which hamper the already
difficult task of building a national and social consensus (Treu 1994: 162). From
1946 until 1992 wages were indexed (scala mobile) by an automatic adjustment in
line with changes in consumer prices. Between 1977 and 1984 several ad hoc
agreements aimed at wage moderation in return for peaceful labour relations.
There were two main problems with those agreements. First, the unions were un-
able to control the wage push from below in addition to the scala mobile. This
prompted the employers, who were traditionally in favour of the scala mobile, to
demand a shift of wage bargaining to the plant level. Second, welfare expenditure
became a major part of social bargaining or quid pro quo political exchange.
Social conflict was “fiscalised” i.e. social consensus had to be bought by immedi-
ate concessions of welfare provisions, because the unions had little trust in the
ability of governments to ensure that any immediate sacrifice by the workers
through restraining their exercise of bargaining power would be rewarded in the
longer term by gains to workers through improved growth and economic stabil-
ity. (Treu 1994: 165)
Since 1984, there have been ongoing negotiations about the merits of concerted
incomes policies. In the 1990s, tripartism re-emerged when the social partners
pressed the government to reduce indirect labour costs: a first tripartite agree-
ment pledged in July 1990 to reduce labour costs through state subsidies. In
1990/91 the negotiations entered a new phase in which the employers were de-
termined to reduce labour costs in the face of growing competition. The unions
were seeking to strengthen the role of union representatives at the plant level and
to gain wider bargaining mandate, whereas the employers still doubted the un-
ions’ ability to control decentralised bargaining.
In July 1992, a historic compromise was struck with the government in which the
three union confederations formally accepted the end of automatic wage indexa-
tion (Regalia and Regini 1998) against the protest of large sections of their mem-
bership and only few days after a general strike. The concession the unions
gained in return for wage moderation was the commitment by the government
and the employers to reform the bargaining system and the plant-level repre-
sentatives. A year after the abolition of the scala mobile, the government and the
social partners signed the Ciampi Protocol (Regini 1997), which reorganised the
bargaining system into two levels: at the sectoral level, agreements lay down
wage norms for several years on the basis of inflation forecasts, and at the second,
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plant level, additional wage bonuses can be paid on the basis of productivity in-
creases. The agreement also modernised the workplace-level union represen-
tation (RSU or Unitary Union Representation) in order to bargain over wages at
the plant level (Regalia and Regini 1998: 477). Since then, wage formation has
been within the framework of nationally set wage guidelines, which are topped
up by plant-level agreements.
In Germany and France, there has been no co-ordination between governments
and social partners with regard to wage bargaining. Employers pushed for de-
centralisation of collective bargaining in order to achieve more flexible and mod-
erate wage formation. In the case of France, the efforts to reform the local bar-
gaining system with the help of the Auroux laws in 1984 did not strengthen the
wage formation system. Wage moderation was achieved by the decentralisation
of wage bargaining and the weakness of French private sector trade unions. In
the German case, Tarifautonomie remains strongly entrenched, and wage modera-
tion continues to be outside the realm of tripartite concertation. In both cases, po-
litical exchanges on wage bargaining were both unnecessary and inconceivable.
On the other hand, in the Dutch and in the Italian case, a credible threat of state
intervention leading to a political exchange with the social partners was a neces-
sary precondition for pacifying the previously unstable wage bargaining systems.
4 Reforming Pensions
Since old age and invalidity programmes account for the largest share of social
expenditures, they are a crucial area for welfare state reform. All four welfare
states had been known to grant very generous earnings-related pension benefits,
with basic or social pensions in the Netherlands and Italy. In particular, public
sector employees received favourable conditions, especially in France and Italy,
but to some degree also in Germany and the Netherlands. Labour shedding
through early retirement was used by employers to adapt to the economic
changes and by governments to reduce labour supply (Esping-Andersen 1996).
Although the cost pressures led to increases in social contributions, retrenchment
efforts in the area of old age and disability pensions met with considerable wide-
spread resistance, particularly by unions.
In all four countries, the social partners are involved in the self-administration of
social insurance schemes. Parity representation became the golden rule in Ger-
many in a deliberate effort to institutionalise a societal balance between labour
and capital (Manow 1997). A tripartite format with state-nominated “arbitrators”
between the opposing social partners was common in the Netherlands and Italy.
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In French social insurance, the bipartite board elects the president of the fund, but
the state nominates the director (Palier 1997). In addition, all countries but Ger-
many have a tradition of tripartite Social and Economic Councils, which play a
more or less institutionalised role in advising social policy-making. The Nether-
lands and France also stand out because of the importance of collectively negoti-
ated schemes for supplementary and pre-retirement pensions that are directly
administered by the social partners.
In the Netherlands, favourable disability pensions were massively advanced by
unions to ease the labour market and by employers to shed off less productive
but highly protected workers (Aarts and Jong 1996). In the early 1980s, almost
Chronology B: Concertation on Pension and Sick Pay Reforms
Netherlands
1985 Cut in disability / sick pay benefits
1987 Social welfare changes (disability and unemployment benefits)
1993/94 Bonus/penalty system and sick pay mandate for employers
1995 Restructuring of self-administration (tripartite supervision)
Italy
1992 Amato pension reform by decree
1993 Ciampi government: supplementary pension framework
1994 General strike against Berlusconi reform plans, fall of government
1995 Dini government-union agreement on pension reform
1997 Prodi government-union agreement on pension reform
Germany
1989 Pension reform (broad consensus)
1996 Tripartite agreement on part-time pension before end of Alliance talks
1996 Pension reform (limited consensus)
1996 Sick pay law (contested by unions, becomes subject of collective negotiations)
1999 Suspension of 1996 pension reform by new Left-Green government
France
1993 Balladur “recovery plan”: phased-in pension reform
1995 Juppé reform plan causes strike wave, concessions after tripartite talks
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14% of the Dutch labour force received either disability or early retirement pen-
sions (Visser and Hemerijck 1997: 9). In two reform steps in 1985 and 1987, the
Dutch government lowered sickness and disability benefits and tightened eligibil-
ity rules despite protests from the unions. These measures showed only limited
success since collectively negotiated schemes were able to fill the replacement gap
left after the reform. When the Social Democrats returned to power, linking of
pension benefits was made conditional on employment growth since 1992 (Visser
and Hemerijck 1997: 140–141). As disability numbers soared further, the Centre-
Left coalition announced radical reform changes in 1991, provoking the largest
demonstration organised by the unions in post-war history and a deep division
within the Social Democratic party. The government changed the rules on sick
leave and disability insurance in several steps during the years that followed, in-
troducing disincentives for employers abuse and tightening eligibility criteria and
re-examination, particularly of younger claimants. Firms were required to pay
sick pay during the first weeks of an employee’s absence due to illness (Aarts and
Jong 1996; Visser and Hemerijck 1997). The 1994 elections led to substantial losses
for the governing parties. However, the Social Democrats returned to power thanks
to a Left-Liberal coalition and were able to continue with their reform efforts.
During the 1980s, Germany was more successful in cost-containment than its
neighbour, the Netherlands, but expected demographic shifts and widespread
early retirement had put the need for a substantial pension reform on the agenda.
With the support of the Social Democratic opposition and both social partners,
the Centre-Liberal government enacted a consensual pension reform in 1989, the
day before the “fall of the Berlin Wall”. Beginning in 1992, the reform gradually
raised the retirement age to 65 for women and men, phased out most pre-
retirement options and introduced flexible pensions with actuarial deductions or
accumulation. Yet German unification led to an extraordinary increase in early
retirement. Since a quarter of public transfers were financed by social transfer
payments, the social contributions increased from 35% in 1990 to 41% of gross
wages in 1996 (Manow 1997: 40–42).
At the beginning of 1996, the Kohl government invited the social partners to sum-
mit talks, and a limited tripartite agreement on part-time pension was agreed
upon in February. Under the pressure of the employers and the junior Liberal
party, the government presented its proposal on welfare retrenchment in April,
including a reduction of sick pay, a general welfare freeze, a gradual extension of
retirement age, and an increased flexibility of employment contracts. The unions
left the summit talks in protest and organised a campaign against the welfare
cuts, while employers welcomed the government’s unilateral measures. Soon af-
terwards the cuts in mandatory sick pay became law. The 1996 pension reform
that was enacted anticipated the phasing-in of benefit cuts and increased age lim-
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its. These measures were suspended by the new Left-Green government after the
1998 election.
The Italian
governments of the 1980s introduced a number of restrictive reforms designed to
keep inflation and public expenditure under control without altering the guiding
principles of the welfare state. The insufficiency of these measures as well as the
lack of an overall strategy led to the radical policy changes of the early 1990s.
(Niero 1996: 118)
The Amato government introduced a short-term rise in contribution rates by de-
cree but also planed the long-term increase in pension age by five years and
minimum contribution period by ten years phased in over a decade (Ferrera
1997: 240–241). Only a year later, in midst of the deep crisis of the Italian political
system, the technocratic Ciampi government added cost-savings restrictions on
seniority pensions and disability benefits, and introduced the legal and fiscal
framework for supplementary pensions to be negotiated by social partners on the
branch or company level. However, these remained only small incremental steps,
that had little impact on workers’ “acquired rights”, particularly on those of sen-
ior workers.
Yet in late 1994 the new Centre-Right government under Berlusconi “tried to
change unwritten rules of the game that had regulated the Italian social security
system” (Regini and Regalia 1997: 216), provoking widespread protest by the
unions and on the streets which was able to force the government to backtrack. In
May, the new technocratic Dini government, supported by the parliamentary
Left, was able to strike a deal with the unions (while the employers refused to
sign), phasing in substantial pension reforms (Ferrera 1997: 241). While the law
introduced important system changes and broke with the tradition of incremen-
talist policy making, the
key condition for obtaining trade-union consensus was, in fact, retention of the
previous pension system as far as more elderly workers were concerned, with the
introduction of a new and more rigorous system for workers with lower seniority.
(Regini and Regalia 1997: 217)
The Centre-Left Prodi government continued with the concerted policy approach,
further developing the framework for supplementary pensions and implement-
ing the harmonisation of pensions. The reform of the seniority pensions that had
been put on a two-year freeze in 1995, however, remained controversial between
the Prodi government and the unions as well as the small Communist party (RC),
on which the government depended. In fact, as part of a deal with the RC on
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thirty-five hour work week legislation, and further negotiations with the unions,
the government was able to accelerate some pension reforms in 1997.
As in Italy, radical unilateral reform efforts have met with widespread protest in
France, but unlike its Italian counterpart, the French government has not been
able to engage in enduring concertation on substantial reforms with trade unions
and employers. Given their responsibility for unemployment insurance, which
also covers supplementary early retirement plans, the social partners had to come
to bipartite agreements on cost-saving measures in order to reform social policy.
Moreover, the government offered state aid in return for a larger say in the re-
structuring of these private schemes at various times. The Balladur government,
after threatening to regulate by degree, was able to sign a tripartite protocol in
1993. The protocol installed a tripartite supervisory committee and limited the
state aid to one-third of the accumulated deficit in the unemployment scheme.
With regard to pension reforms, the Balladur government encountered surpris-
ingly little opposition when, after meeting with the social partners and studying a
commission report, it devised a recovery plan that increased the general solidar-
ity tax for a pension liability fund, introduced price indexation for pensions, and
gradually extended the contribution period.
Following the election of President Chirac, the new Conservative Juppé govern-
ment had announced a massive reform package in November 1995 which pro-
voked widespread protests. Since the special public sector schemes were also to
be reformed, the state railways unions and some other public sector workers
went on strike during the winter of 1995/96. The politically fragmented union
movement was also split over its position on reform: the FO (Force ouvrière),
which had a strong position in the national sickness funds, defended the status
quo, the Communist CGT (Confédération générale du travail) took a leading role
in the strikes, and the moderate CFDT (Confédération française démocratique du
travail) partly recognised the need to reform. While the government made con-
cessions to postpone some policies, in particular concerning the special pension
schemes in the public sector, it implemented some urgent measures of the social
security reform unilaterally by emergency decrees and parliamentary legislation.
This brief analysis of the pension reform process in four countries indicates how
much governments need the consent of the social partners to achieve major re-
forms. In addition to their veto opportunities, the social partners have the capac-
ity to undo state induced reforms by developing supplementary schemes when
they engage in collective bargaining. In Germany, increasing economic and finan-
cial challenges led to reform efforts in 1989 and again in 1996. The first was built
upon a broad government–opposition consensus, while the latter reform failed to
achieve concertation except for part-time early retirement. In France, the Conser-
vative government had put pensions on the reform agenda in 1993 under Balla-
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dur and again in 1995 under Juppé. In the second case this sparked widespread
opposition by workers and unions since it affected the strike-prone public em-
ployees more directly and immediately. Similarly, the Berlusconi government en-
countered widespread resistance when it tried to enact more radical pension re-
forms than had been envisaged before, while later Centre-Left governments were
able to negotiate pension reforms with the main unions which gradually phased
in changes, thus having a smaller impact on older workers. Finally, in the Neth-
erlands, the reforms in 1987 by the Centre-Liberal government cut the generous
benefits and eligibility criteria of the disability pensions in the early 1990s.
5 Conditions for Concerted Reform
Our analysis of wage and social policy has shown that in the Netherlands and It-
aly parallel processes of concertation have emerged. The Dutch social partners
regained concertation capacity by agreeing in the Wassenaar Accord to moderate
wage formation and to cut social costs, thereby forestalling state intervention. The
process of concertation in wage bargaining helped also bring about concerted re-
form in others arenas, though this was far from immediate. It was only after the
government took unilateral reform measures to restructure the governance in so-
cial policy administration that the social partners returned to tripartite concerta-
tion. The Dutch concerted reform process was relatively sequential (from wage
moderation to social policy reform), taking more than a decade. It was also a
relatively open process of gradual social learning that did not follow any precon-
ceived “model” (Visser and Hemerijck 1997).
In contrast, the Italian concertation process was more crisis-driven because of in-
ternal reasons (the fall of the old partitocrazia) and external pressures (meeting the
EMU criteria). As the first step, the Ciampi pact not only abolished the scala mobile
and committed the social partners to wage moderation, it also brought the frag-
mented bargaining practice into a hierarchical system. Since the state was rela-
tively weak and incapable of enforcing this aim, the technocratic government
needed the support of employers’ associations and trade unions in the midst of
the political crisis to legitimate its reforms. The defeated radical reform plans of
the Berlusconi government – a year before the French strike wave – showed that
Italian unions were able to obstruct reform efforts. Yet the subsequent “deals”
showed also that they were able to enter into concertation with the governments,
which needed the consent of the unions in implementing their social policy re-
forms. The linkage between wage and social policies is most simultaneous and
explicit in the Italian case – the political exchange was facilitated by the agree-
ment on wage formation and offered a cushioned welfare reform which sheltered
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the older workers and current pensioners from the severe impact of the reforms,
thus requiring further adjustment rounds in the future.
Our analysis of the German case showed that until the fall of the Berlin Wall in
November 1989, the system was still producing wage moderation and gradual
welfare adaptation, though a decade later problems had accumulated in both ar-
eas. Concerted reform efforts in 1996 were impeded by the Centre-Liberal govern-
ment’s effort to impose welfare cuts for electoral reasons. The only concerted re-
form (on part-time pensions in 1996) shows that a consensus was possible, yet
only where the interests of the social partners coincided in externalising social
costs onto the public scheme.
Finally, the last case shows how little basis there is for concertation in France, de-
spite many efforts by Right and Left governments to invite the “social partners”
to tripartite concertation. The state-led initiatives to reform collective bargaining
and induce negotiations on working-time reduction were unable to force or even
lure employers and worker representatives to meaningful bargaining at the local
and sectoral level. The Auroux laws weakened unions and pre-empted higher
level bargaining. In the realm of social policy, while the unions have tried to de-
fend their autonomy from state intervention because self administration in social
insurance provides them with a source of legitimisation and resources, they have
continued to become more and more dependent on state subsidies. Moreover,
substantial welfare reforms such as the Juppé plan caused social unrest and union
protests. The state remained incapable of achieving concertation; it tried to inter-
vene into social policy by increasing state subsidies and shifting social contribu-
tions to state-controlled general taxes.
What stands out when we look at the institutional prerequisites for concerted re-
form? First of all, concertation is not always a suitable tool for reform. The French
example clearly shows that tripartite concertation is meaningless when the social
partners are unable to regulate the labour market and when wage moderation is
achieved by the decentralisation of wage bargaining. Where social partners can
only obstruct political-decision making, but do not have the capacity to self-
regulate in a responsible way, governments have to resort to unilateral reform
policies, though they are unable to control collectively negotiated schemes. Em-
ployers on the other hand relied on micro-corporatism at the workplace level
since it allowed more flexibility, but they opposed tripartite concertation at the
national level.
Secondly, the capacity of the state to intervene into self-governed policy fields in
order to overcome reform blockages seems to be crucial. In the realm of wage
policy, the Dutch and Italian governments had the possibility to intervene. A
wage freeze was a credible threat by the Dutch government in the early 1980s,
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and in Italy the abolition of the scala mobile in the early 1990s was contentious but
it did receive union approval.
Similarly, with regard to social security, the ability of governments to intervene
varies considerably between countries. Both France and the Netherlands share a
tradition of self-governance of an important part of social insurance: the French
social partners run the unemployment and voluntary early retirement funds,
while the Dutch early retirement schemes are negotiated at the sectoral level by
the collective bargaining partners. In France these negotiated schemes have in-
creasingly run into financial difficulties and therefore required state intervention
to set contribution levels. In the Netherlands, the schemes have been incorporated
into a larger project in which the social partners, once accustomed to making so-
cial policies at the expense of the taxpayer, have been asked to take on responsi-
bility for social costs. The intervention of the Dutch government in reorganising
the governance of social insurance, and the transition to a system of state-led tri-
partite supervision were just as important reforms as substantive changes in
benefits were. In Italy and Germany the political system remained responsible for
setting conditions for contributions and benefits, not the social partners sitting on
self-administration boards. In the case of Italy, this allowed the government to
negotiate more cushioned reforms in return for wage moderation, whereas in the
German case the two realms remained separated and responsibilities divided: the
state had to worry about social expenditure, the collective bargaining partners
about wages.
Thirdly, political exchanges must serve the interest of the social partners, which
depend on the degree to which they can insulate themselves from the pressures
of the employment crisis. In Italy, the Ciampi pact finally reorganised the tenuous
relationship between national and local bargaining hierarchy and strengthened
union representation on the workplace level. Trade unions became a partner for
negotiating social policy changes which helped to circumvent widespread oppo-
sition as had occurred against Berlusconi’s unilateral welfare cuts.
In the case of the Netherlands, the unions and employers had a higher degree of
centralisation and could rely on existing social partnership institutions. Since the
Dutch unions suffered from long-term membership losses and were rather weak
at the workplace level, they had to worry about the employers’ push towards de-
centralisation. Committing themselves to concertation was the only way they
could regain influence over wage bargaining.
Compared to their Dutch counterparts, German trade unions are firmly en-
trenched at the workplace and in the collective bargaining system. They were
therefore under less pressure to make concertation a success since they still mus-
tered enough organisational powers by traditional collective bargaining without
making deals with the government. Responsibility for social insurance rests
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solely on the government’s shoulders, while the unions can count on mobilising
political opposition by the labour wing of the Centre and Left parties against
unilateral reform projects.
Therefore, there are some indications that the centralised structure of trade un-
ions – which used to be the precondition for “neo-corporatist” concertation in the
1970s – might not play the predominant role for concertation in welfare reforms.
Despite the fear of Italian employers about wage drifts, Italian trade unions could
enter into voluntary wage restraints and, with the help of the state, rationalise the
collective bargaining hierarchy. The German case might be used for arguing that
even an opposite effect can be observed: strong and centralised unions which
have a stable power base might be less inclined to enter into negotiations on wel-
fare reforms because they have little to gain from them. But even when interest
organisations are willing and able to participate in concertation, much depends
on the role of the state in reforming the governance structure and in compelling
the social partners to come to a responsible agreement.
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